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  Jennifer A. McMahon
1. Introduction
I argue in this paper that our concept of pictorial realism should
include a reference to perceptual proficiency relative to a
cultural context. I argue this by demonstrating the greater
explanatory power of such a concept for understanding pictorial
realism. The central idea is that gestalt-like mechanisms that
are normally involved in object recognition can be deployed at
a second order level in picture perception. This means that
whole configurations can be perceived as made up of the kind
of relations that would normally trigger awareness of a discrete
object. Styles of picturing that exploit this second order
gestalt-like mechanism are learnable and transferable. Once
such a style of picturing is internalised, a picture that exploits
this style will be experienced as true and fitting.
2. Depicting Objects Is a Sufficient Condition of Pictorial
Realism.
Recognising a series of marks as a form is sufficient for the
lowest threshold of realism, even when the form is simply a
form in space such as we would find in an Ives Tanguy
painting. Furthermore, what counts towards this lowest
threshold of realism in one picture may count against it in
another. For example, in Impressionist pictures, a
differentiation between colour tones counts towards realism
while in synthetic cubism this would add to the busyness of the
design, obstructing unity and hence working against the grasp
of the series of marks as cohesive forms. The recognition of an
object in synthetic cubism relies upon maintaining the dominant
axes of the depicted objects even while violating the relation
between the dominant and subordinate axes of parts of the
object. If this were combined with accurate differentiation
between colour tones, the various parts would tend to appear
as separate entities rather than a part of a larger composite,
and it is upon the latter that our ability to recognise the object
depends. Standard experienced resemblance accounts of
pictorial realism are unable to account for this variability in
what counts towards realism in pictures.
3. Having the Capacity to Perceive a Series of Marks on a
Surface as a Unified Whole is a Necessary Condition of
Perceiving Objects in a Picture.
The configuration is a key concept in understanding pictorial
realism. To explain the role of configuration in judgments of
pictorial realism I assume a representational theory of mind
and perception that recognises four terms in the perceptual
relation: (i) an object of perception, (ii) a visual field (refers to
a mediatory level of perception between the world and our
consciousness of it), (iii) an intentional object (or object as
represented), and (iv) the object interpreted. Most theories of
art concentrate on the fourth term. The configuration refers to
the relation between the second and third terms; between the
visual field and the intentional object.
Normally the second in my terms is ignored as not the concern
of philosophy (direct realism ignores it) or given more cognitive

status than is compatible with psychological theory (sense data
in indirect realism), and in some cases both the second and
third terms are ignored (as in naive realism). As I am
concerned with the tacit level of perceptual learning, I do not
examine the object of the fourth term. The visual field, which is
the second term in the perceptual relation, refers to the visual
data before we are conscious of it. The visual field is not a
mental entity (we are not aware of it) because we cannot be
aware of the visual data until it is subsumed under a
description.[1] I use the term description to mean a structure
which organises the visual data, giving some features of the
object more psychological salience than others.
In order to demonstrate how this works consider an experiment
reported by Fred Drestke in which subjects are shown an array
of nine or more letters. Although subjects can remember only
three or four letters under brief exposure, which letters they
remember is determined by a stimulus shown them after the
letters have been removed. This suggests that the system
retains the sensory data but the cognitive system can only
utilise a small portion of what is retained. It only has the
capacity for accessing a limited number of the items stored in
memory. What can be called to consciousness is determined by
which structure is brought to bear upon the sensory
information. Dretske writes: "We need not . . . think of this as
the persistence of an image. What persists is a structure in
which incoming information about a pictorial array is coded in
preparation for its cognitive utilization." [2] I envisage the
configuration to be such a structure.
4. Having the Capacity to Grasp Visual Data as a Second
Order Gestalt is a Necessary Condition for the Capacity
to Perceive a Series of Marks on a Surface as a Unified
Whole.
A configuration can be thought of as a higher order description
or a description that picks up the accents from the lower order
descriptions in such a way that the one unified structure
results. When we perceive objects in the world, the set of cells
that register between-object relations (view variant) are
distinct from the set of cells that register within-object
relations (view invariant).[3] The former are responsible for
providing information relevant for judging our position in
relation to objects; the latter for object recognition. When we
perceive pictures, however, it seems as though we deploy the
principles of within-object relations at two levels: first to the
marks that unite to form the objects depicted and second to
the marks that correspond to the perceived spaces between
objects. In this way, we can perceive a scene made up of
various objects as a unified structure or a second order gestalt.
That is, at the configurational level we can devise the one
description for the picture. Once we have a description, we
have an intentional or represented object. The visual data
afford certain incorrigible visual elements but which of these
are most salient within the represented object depends on the
way they are configured. One would expect the details of the
represented object would vary across people, cultures, and of
course species.
5. Only Those Pictures Whose Configuration Can Give
Rise to a Second Order Gestalt Can Be Readily

Internalised, That Is, Can Be Naturally Generative.
The necessity of postulating the second term in the perceptual
relation is that, given any object, the visual field is such that
there might be a number of ways to configure the data to
accommodate an intentional object. The nature of the resulting
configuration will depend on the perceptual principles or
structures brought to bear upon the data. Perceptual structures
can be the result of perceptual learning. Once you have
recognised an impressionist picture, for example, you can
recognise this style in unfamiliar examples.
Once a particular configuration is grasped as a second order
gestalt, it is internalised and this means it is naturally
generative. Internalisation means that the structure is tacitly
remembered, that it can be recognised and brought to bear
upon other visual arrays by certain triggers in the visual
field.[4] This constraint, rather than resemblance, would
constitute the key feature of pictorial realism, even though
resemblance is a corollary of naturally generative pictorial
systems. It would explain variations in judgments of pictorial
realism across cultures, and slow dawning realism.
For example, someone brought up in a traditional Japanese
culture might configure a Victorian lounge room quite
differently from a Westerner. They might have receptors for
certain key configurational features that are not there: flat and
empty spaces, dominant verticals, and uncluttered horizontal
surfaces with understated and brief curves incorporated into,
and integral to, the overall effect. Without the corresponding
configuration for Victorian decor they might just perceive clutter
and a confusion of contrasts and patterns that resist a unified
configuration. The Westerner, by contrast, would tend to
organize the elements of Victorian decor into a less poignant
configuration of many contrasts and would be more
comfortable with a number of less dominating and overlapping
linear elements, with flourishes happily accommodated as
accents rather than integral to the dominant forms. We might
all see the same thing but perceive different configurations. Our
judgments of realism will differ accordingly.
Regarding slow dawning realism, if this approach is on the right
track we would expect novel configurations to confuse those
with a limited number of configurations to draw upon. For
example, what might appear jumbled and inchoate on first
viewing, might, on viewing a series of works by the same artist
or designer, or works that have been influenced by that artist
or designer, begin to reveal a global unity. This would involve
being trained, through looking at a naturally generative
configuration, to select certain features from the environment,
ignoring others. Depending on one's sensitivities and the time
and effort put into perceiving pictures and other human
artefacts, one would begin to perceive the visual elements of
the picture that initially seemed incoherent or disunified as
unified and correct. This is in fact what happened in a very
public way after the first exposure of the public to
Impressionism in the 1870s in Paris. What at first seemed
incoherent later appeared realistic.
6. Therefore, a Criterion of Pictorial Realism Is That It
Gives Rise to a Style of Configuration That Is Naturally
Generative.

When separate visual elements are perceived as cohering
within a unified structure as opposed to constituting separate
entities, a configuration results. We are able to create
numerous styles of configuration compatible with relevant
principles of perception (principles of within-object relations),
some of which push these principles to their limit but which
nonetheless result in a naturally generative style. Once
internalised, such configurations can be brought to bear upon
other visual arrays.
The internalised configurations that we have stored in visual
memory determine what we notice and hence what we learn.
The application of such a configuration in the course of
perception would make some features of the environment
salient, while others would drop out of consciousness. Not only
painters' styles but any style of configuring that one has
absorbed through interior design or architecture might be
equally effective.
Resemblance theories of depiction conceive of pictorial realism
as a more or less monolithic, stable and objective matter.
However, the variety of styles that serve the purposes of
depiction in non-Western cultures suggests that realism (when
conceived as determining the degree to which an object is
visually recognised in a depiction) even when understood as
determined by a natural generative system[5] is far more
multifaceted than the standing "resemblance" theories would
allow. Compare the split style of Haida Art with the Rembrandt
pen and ink drawing provided below.

Rembrandt, A Canal with a Rowing Boat, pen and ink drawing.
This image is used with the permission of Chatsworth Photo Library.
Any form of reproduction, transmission, performance, display,
rental, lending or storage in any retrieval system without the
written consent of the copyright holders is prohibited.

Robert Davidson's Split Beaver (1975) This is an example of the
Split Style of the Haida people, indigenous to Canada. Used by
permission of Robert Davidson.

A theory whose key concept is the configuration can provide an
explanation as to how various styles of depiction can be
experienced as equally realistic. Any experienced resemblance
is experienced relative to one's stored catalogue of possible
configurations. An example of a prediction would be that while
it may be true that indigenous Canadians traditionally raised
will eventually come to recognise certain Western art styles as
realistic if continually exposed to them, this would not mean
that they necessarily cease to perceive their traditional split
style pictures as realistic. It just means that they have added a
new style of configuration to their repertoire. The same would
apply (conversely) for Westerners. Contrary to the standing
resemblance theories, pictorial realism is a matter of the
degree to which underlying perceptual principles are deployed
in ways compatible with recognition and there are numerous
candidates for this.
7. Lopes Presents a Hybrid Theory of Pictorial Realism.
According to Lopes,[6] a necessary condition of experienced
resemblance in picture perception is that the roles and
purposes of the depiction are known by the perceiver and
satisfied from the perceiver's point of view. This is not a
conventionalist theory of depiction because, as Lopes points out
after David Lewis,[7] a convention needs to have by definition
an equally satisfactory alternative such that a choice between
the two is arbitrary. Lopes' notion is that the choices between
alternatives of style are determined by the roles and purposes
of the depiction and are hence not arbitrary and in turn, not
conventional.

Lopes advances on the standard experienced resemblance
theories by explicitly recognising the fact that pictorial realism
is relative to style, and this is the work that intentionality does
in his theory. He also draws upon entrenchment to explain how
a style which satisfies the required roles and purposes comes
to be perceived as realistic. Satisfying roles and entrenchment
together would seem to be sufficient for pictorial realism,
according to Lopes. On Lopes's account, a style is formed in
response to artistic intention and through entrenchment comes
to be perceived as realistic to the extent that it serves its
intentionality (roles and purposes). While I accept that learning
about artistic intentions can influence how one directs one's
attention to certain aspects of a picture and hence can
influence the resulting perceived configuration, intentions and
entrenchment have limited explanatory power. Lopes' theory
cannot accommodate the fact that pictorial configurations that
once may have been experienced as unrealistic, can over time
and with continued exposure, come to be experienced as
resembling their object, even without the spectator's
knowledge of the roles and purposes for which the depiction
was designed.
Lopes's theory needs the added constraint of natural
generativity. Conversely, his theory does not explain the fact
that there are pictorial styles of whose artistic intentions we are
aware, yet that are never experienced as realistic or resembling
anything except in a trivial way. For example, analytical cubism
always draws attention to its surface through its attention to
changes in surface orientation relative to the picture plane. In
many of these pictures we can barely recognise an object.
When we can, it is usually through those parts of the image
that deviate from the principles of analytical cubism, such as
when eyes are given an outline or a nose is provided with a
continual surface so that we are able to perceive volume. An
habituation or entrenchment theory even when coupled with
artistic or community intentions will not do because it does not
explain the fact that not just any style which satisfies intentions
will end up being experienced as realistic. By contrast, pictorial
realism according to an account that includes the naturally
generative principles of configuration can explain this
peculiarity.
8. An Implication
According to Kendall Walton[8], knowing and understanding
the context of an artwork and artistic intentions is normally a
condition of gaining the optimal in pleasure and significance
from an artwork.[9] One might interpret this to mean that the
relevant categories of evaluation are all top down theoretical
categories. This would place the act of interpretation relevant
to his categories as pertaining to the relation between the third
and fourth terms in the perceptual relation identified above,
that is, between mental representation and interpretation. If,
on the other hand, the categories include varieties of
configuration, which pertain to the relation between the second
and third terms of the perceptual relation, a different
conclusion can be reached. That is, there are ways of
perceiving artworks such that the greatest pleasure and
significance they can afford is due to perceiving a configuration
in them that need not have been one which could have been
recognised by the artist. The structures that we have

internalised over a lifetime will influence the way we configure
the art from the past, and may in some cases optimise our
enjoyment of it. An example is the effect of familiarisation with
Jackson Pollack's oeuvre and those influenced by him on the
perception of traditional Australian indigenous works.[10]
9. Conclusion
By incorporating the characteristics of a configurational
structure as set out above into our concept of pictorial realism,
we can account for:
i) greater flexibility in our perceptions of pictorial realism than
the standard resemblance theories would allow;
ii) the possibility of discovery and revelation in the
development of pictorial realism, which convention and
entrenchment theories cannot account for;
iii) slow dawning realism (only entrenchment theories explain
this but they require the aid of artistic intentions);
iv) the fact that some styles, even when they fulfil purposes
and are habitually experienced, fail to become naturally
generative. This is a problem for convention, entrenchment and
information theories of pictorial realism, but not for a
configurational account of pictorial realism.
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